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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD ENTER AN ORDER APPROVING THE STIPULATION
OF APRIL 16, 1990, AND DISMISSING THE APPEAL.
The appellees advance the argument that a settlement agreement reached by the parties to this appeal on April 16, 1990, moots
the appeal.

(Brief of Appellees, pp. 12-13.) The appellants agree

that the parties reached a settlement agreement on April 16, 1990,
a copy of which appears in the Addendum to Appellees' brief.
Appellants also agree that this settlement agreement renders the
appeal moot under Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Pursuant to Rule 37, this suggestion of mootness is presented to
the Court with a request that the Court accept and approve the

settlement and direct the clerk to enter an order of dismissal of
the appeal.
Appellants do not believe that it is just that they receive
less than the $5,800,000.00

awarded

as attorney

fees by the

December 6, 1988 Order of the trial court, together with all
interest accrued thereon.

Appellants believe that the results

achieved, $44,000,000.00 for their clients, were beyond anyone's
predictions.

Nonetheless, the settlement agreement, which repre-

sents significant concessions by appellants, was reached as a
result of long and arduous negotiation and appellants feel a moral
and ethical commitment to be bound by the terms thereof.
Accordingly, the appellants join appellees in urging that the
Court approve the settlement agreement and dismiss the appeal.
POINT II
THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE APPLIES TO THIS CASE.
Appellees argue that the law of the case doctrine does not
apply to findings of fact, but only to conclusions of law.
of Appellees, p, 9, n. 3.)

(Brief

Appellants agree that the classic

definition of the doctrine has usually been expressed in terms of
a legal decision at one stage of litigation binding future legal
decisions in successive stages of the same litigation.

The policy

considerations behind this doctrine, however, apply with equal
force to the

M

factual" determination made by the trial court.

Where the trial court made factual findings in the December 5,
1988, Memorandum Decision, based solely on the record before it and

2

its own observations, and where no new evidence was presented
thereafter to the contrary, it was error for the trial court to
make different

findings

in the October

31, 1989, Memorandum

Decision. Moreover, as appellees apparently agree, the trial court
entered its conclusions of law in the December 5, 1988, Memorandum
Decision, to the effect that reasonable and fair attorneys fees
under the circumstances were $5,800,000.00, and it was error for
the trial court to reverse its own legal decision in the subsequent
October 31, 1989, Memorandum Decision.
Appellees also argue that the law of the case doctrine does
not limit the power of the trial court to reconsider its interlocutory decisions.

(Brief of Appellees, p. 9, n. 3.)

cannot agree with this proposition.

Appellants

The Utah Court of Appeals has

applied the law of the case doctrine to review of interlocutory
orders. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d
42, 44-45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Nothing changed in this case between December 5, 1988, and
October 31, 1989, which would justify the trial court in changing
its findings, conclusions and decision.

Indeed, the only new

evidence presented to the trial court after its original decision
either supported the original fees or an increase in the fees not
a reduction.
hereto

(See, e.g., Affidavit of Sol Schreiber, attached

in the Addendum

and hereby

incorporated

herein.

Mr.

Schreiber is a highly regarded, nationally prominent expert in the
awarding of fees to class counsel in class actions, who has served
as a Special Master in more proceedings than any other, including
3

In Re: Agent Orange.

See also the proffer of Thomas T. Anderson,

attached hereto in the Addendum and hereby incorporated herein.
Mr. Anderson is a nationally known trial lawyer with extensive
experience in class actions and contingent fee cases.)

The trial

court erred in reconsidering and modifying its decision.
CONCLUSION
The settlement agreement reached by the parties should be
approved by this Court and the clerk should be directed to enter
an Order of dismissal of the appeal. Alternatively, the Memorandum
Decision of October 31, 1989, should be vacated, and the Memorandum
Decision and Order of December 5 and December 6, 1988, should be
reinstated.
DATED this

/CJ -

day of May, 1990.

JACKSON HOWARD and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellants

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
2 ^ ^

day of May, 1990.
Craig G. Adamson
Dart, Adamson & Kasting
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
4

Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.
Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson
Clark Learning Office Center, Suite 700
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Thomas T. Billings
Robert D. Merrill
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 South Main St., #1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
R. Paul Van Dam
Jan C. Graham
Reed M. Stringham III
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Sheila Bohard
D.O.I.T.
P.O. Box 9516
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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APPENDIX "A"
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF FEE AWARDED
TO PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL
(SOL SCHREIBER)

SOL SCHREIBER
Milberg Weiss Bershdd
Specthrie & Lerach
One Pennsylvania Plaza
New York, New York 10 119
(212) 594-5300
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICJ COURT IN AMIJ FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF IT AH

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
FEE AWARDED TO PLAINTIFFS
COUNSEL

DOLLY PLUMB, et al . ,
Plaintiffs,
vs

Case No

STATE OF UTAH, et al . ,

C3? 4879

Judge David S. Young

Defendants.

SOL SCHREIBER, being duly sworn says

I am an attorney licensed to practice in the courts of
the State of New York.

Attached to this affidavit is my

curriculum vitae.
The counsel for the depositors in this action have
asked me to review and render an opinion on the compensation
awarded to them following their settlement with the State of
Utah last year.

They have also asked that I render an opinion

on the methodology used by James U. Jensen, who is the Master
appointed in this case, to review costs incurred by class
counsel and Depositors of Insured Thrifts (DOIT), the
non-profit corporation organized for the benefit of the Utah
depositors in this action.

To accomplish th.s task I have reviewed a series of
documents and other materials, including
1.

Motion for Preliminary and rin^I Appioval of
Attorneys Foes and Costs

2.

Supplemental Memoiandum in Supp-:t of Attorneys
Fees for Class COUHLPI,

3.

Memoranda [Jec'/^on jf

4.

Order of December 'v 1^88

5.

First Interim Rupert

6.

Order ~)t December 16. 1988

7.

Third Interim Rpport.

Decnnb^r C , 198M •

After consideration of what I heWP of>&n and reviewed,
and based on my experience as Master in a scries of significant
cases (listed in the attached curriculum vitae), as a former
judicial officer (U.S. Magistrate, S.D.N.Y. 1971-78), as
professor of law ;n complex litigation (ForUhatv. University
School of Law, 1972-86), and a teacher in the area of complex
litiqation and class actions in continuing legal education
circles for more than twenty years, it is my considered opinion
that:
1.

The fee awarded to class counsel in this case of

$5,800,000 is reasonable one,

whether considered on a common

fund basis, a lodestar approach, or a hybrid of the two.

It is

also significant that the fee falls at the minimum expressed in
the 1987 fee agreement between class counsel and DOIT.
agreement was in itself, in my opinion, a reasonable and

The fee

careful effort to set forth parameters for compensating class
counsel, subject to approval of the court, ind it should be
given considerable weight.
2.

On a common fund basis, the

of $29,000,000.

fee .warded was 20%

I understand class counsel voluntarily agreed

not to seek a fee on the additional $15,000,000 recovered from
the St Ate of Utah.

In my experience a for* of 20°* in common

fund cases is a reasonable one in light of the quality of work,
the expertise required, the result obtained, and the other
factors that illustrate the work that class counsel did for the
depositors in this class action.

Put another way, the opinion

of the Master that one-third of the original tee award should
be strucK is completely meritless.

It only stands to reason

that counsel must be compensated reasonably and consistent with
the job they have done.

In my judgment, the Master does not

begin with that approach.

It appears the Master simply labels

himself an advocate for putting as much money in the
depositors' pockets as possible, disregarding the depositors'
duty to pay a fair fee and costs associated with counsels'
efforts in this litigation.

The depositors are not well served

by undercutting their counsel and service providers, either on
a basis of simple equity or in looking forward to their further
need for counsel and service providers in this action.
Master's approach is at best a short-sighted policy.

The

The

depositors recognize it as suchf since they have filed their

own papers, prepared by t:he*r own special counsel, attacking
the Master for paternal 53m m an effort tc avoid their opinions.
3.

On a lodestar basis, the fee re class counsel is

quite reasonable.

When the time spent oy counsel implementing

the settlement with the State is conoider* ; in addition to
their earlier time, 1 understand that the multiplier here would
be less than 3.00 to yield a fee of $5,300,000, which again is
very reasonable,

^fte depositors depend oi\ class counsel under

the Thrift Settlement Legislation of 1988 to cany on with
their effort to recover the balance of principal and interest
due to the depositors.

Thin requires collaboration with the

State and California Union Insurance Company. I believe this
cannot be accomplished without, satisfying the reasonable
obligations of the depositors to their counsel and to the
service providers they depend on to prepare their case.

Simply

to cut fees and costs is, in my opinion, a fundamental error
and counterproductive.
4,

In accord with Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, which is substantially identical to the federal
rule, one should look to the court's orders of reference to
determine the breadth of the Master's appointment.

In the

December 5, 1988 Memorandum Decision, the December 6, 1988, and
the December 16, 1988 Order, the Master's scope of authority is
limited to an examination of the propriety and accuracy of
amounts claimed for costs incurred by various consultants and

expeit witnesses m

connectl^r w-th -ne t^ass action and a

ieport to the court on tne Ma£t**L - tmcmvjs m

tnat regard.

do not believe the fotegoinj Meant *r/Jui* Decision and Orders
permit the Master to examine ih^ issue of attorneys
class counsel.

Indeed, the coiiV

fees for

hnr icz ied its decision and

final otdei on tne matter r,f attorneys

ffes.

It seems clear.,

therefore, that thete is no n^ed, a-d th^ rourr had no intent,
to refer the matter of attorneys
attention.

tees ^o the Master s

It is my considered opinion M'ar in reviewing

attorney's fees foi class counsel the Master has addressed
matters clearly outside th* scope of nt? Rule 53 appointment,
thus, it is respectfully submitted that tne recommendation of
the Master on attorneys

fees for class counsel should thus oe

disregarded by the court,
5.

With respect to the costs of prosecuting an

important class action.

1 believe that the Master is misguided

in his approach to the standards to be followed in reviewing
costs,

It is obvious that when a class action is over, one can

minimize costs expended by class counsel

Experts are

sometimes retained who prove in the last analysis to have been
of limited value; or depositions may be taken that ultimately
are never used; accountants may be hired to review the work of
other auditors and find that thuy mubt tLdce many blind alleys
before they discover the route to the result they need.
examples could be multiplied many times.

The

Using only hindsight,

and not an analysis ot trie ^iiuatiu;; that faced counsel at the
time, the Master appears to lw/'-;< critiaed and LP:used to permit
the depositors to v^Y '^ctny or the costs of tl en. highly
successful suit againsr the* Sta*e.

It is more than a little

ironic thar class counsel, whose extraordinary success produced
an early settlement from the State, find themselves criticized
as though their efforts and the effoits of the service
providers had instead produced a minimal or unsatisfactory
outcome.

With the extraordinary success in this case, which, I

understand, the Court has more than once referred to as a
"miracle", one would think that the Master would he equally
complimentary of their effort.

Instead, one can read the

Master's report from one end to the other, only to find that he
has filtered from the tcports every basis on which the Court
itself praised the work of counsel to an extraordinary extent,
As an example of the Master'5 errors in this regard is
the manner in which he dealt with the costs of hiring Mr, Todd
Conover and his firm, Edgar, Dunn & Conover.

Mr. Conover was

Comptroller of the Currency in the Reagan administration in the
early 1980's.
FDIC.

As such, he was a member of the board of the

I am advised that he participated in some of the largest

bank insolvency proceedings in the history of the United
States.

He was eminently qualified to assist class counsel in

explaining to the Utah Attorney General's office, members of
the Utah Legislature, and the Governor and his staff

of the vagarjes and ultimately tatal weaKnesses of the Utah
Private Deposit insurance System.

H<=> appears to have done a

reasonably good job, because it is my understanding that the
Governor and Utah Legislature were sufficiently moved, by the
depositors' e-jrly efforts, to appoint a Task Force to study the
matter and to encourage the Governor to enter intu immediate
efforts leading to the ultimate settlement of the case.

While

one may be able to criticize an hour here or an hour there
spent by Mr. Conover , or oy class counsel in dealing with him,
it is not possible in the uncertainty of a developing class
action to be a* efficient as one would like.
basis for judgment is to count results.

The reasonable

In my opinion, class

counsel did an extraordinary job in focusing at a very early
date the willingness of the State of Utah to settle this case
on its merits.

I have not seen in the expenditures that they

recommend to the depositors any sign or motivation of spending
excess funds.

On the contrary, I understand they counseled

with DOIT many times to economize on expenditures and to make
DOIT's money stretch to cover all of their needs.
A Master under Rule 53 is not an advocate for one
side.

He serves, in my judgment., in a judicial capacity -

fully charged as any judge to be even-handed.

In this case, it

appears that, the Master has apparently failed to follow such a
standard.

Furthermore, it Is my understanding that the Master

in gathering evidence failed to follow the appropriate

procedures called for by Rule 53

He nas held no hearings even

after the matter has been brought to his attention,

1 have

also been advised that the Master will not hold a scheduled
hearing on Friday, July 7, despite all the objections to his
prior failure to hold formal hearings, and that he expects
instead to take only informal, oral, or written statements,
Tn summary, at :s my opinion that from the date of his
appointment, the Master went substantially beyond his
appointment to review requested reimbursement costs, did not
proceed with the proper even-handed 'judicial spirit, improperly
considered himself to be the advocate for a cause, ignored the
wishes of the very depositors he claimed to represent, and
reached a flawed and incorrect result.

Dated:

July 6, 1989

Subscribed and Sworn

My Commission Expires:
Nov, 30, 1991
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BLOQRAWtlCAL SKETCH - SOL SChREIB-..
SOL SCHREIBER received a Bachelor of Arts aegree. cum
Uude ttorr City College of New Y m k in 1952, and an LL.B from
Yale Lav School in 1955
Since February 1982. he has been a
•artner in the law firm of tflibera Weiss Bershad Specthne &
Lerach
He is admitted to the bar of the State of New York, to
the United States District Court for the Southern and Eastern
Districts of New York and to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. Mr Schreiber is a member of thp American Bar
Association, the New York State Bar Association, and
Association of the Bar of the City of Now York and has been
elected to the American Law Institute.
In July 1985 Mr Schreiber received the Fcar.cis Rawle
Award, from the American Law Institute/American Bar
Association s Committee on Continuing Professional Education,
for his outstanding achievements in post-admission legal
education.
In November, 1984, Mr. Schreiber received the Legal
Aid Society s Presidential Award.
From 1971 through 1978, Mr. Schreiber served as a
United States Magistrate in the United states District Court
for the Southern District of New York where he conducted
thousands of civil and criminal hearings and supervised
pretrial procedures in many complex civil actions involving
derivative, class, securities, accounting, antitrust, aviation,
professional malpractice and products liabilty, including
Berkey v. Kodak, Litton v, ATT, the Penn Central Commercial
Paper Litigation, the ~Argo Merchant-Nantucket Stranding, and
the Tenerife 747 Collision "cases.
in March, 1974, upon appointment by the Chief Justice
of the United States, he served as a Judicial Member,
Anglo-American Exchange on Civil Procedure.
Mr Schreiber has served, and is presently serving, as
court-appointed Special Master in a series of complex federal
cases, including the Agent Orange Litigation (J. Pratt &
J. Wemstein, E.D.N.Y. 1982 -1984); the sex discrimination suit
against the City University of New York (J. Gagliardi, S.D.N.Y.
1984 •
); the Brooklyn Immigration Detention Center
(J. Nickerson, E.D.N.Y. pro-bono, 1982-1984); The New York
Times sex discrimination settlement (J. Wyatt, S.D.N.Y.
pro-bono, 1978-1983); the MacMillan Publishing Co. sex
discrimination suit (J. Lasker. S.D.N.Y. 1985 ); a
cable-TV contract case - St. Charles Cable T.v. v. Eagle
Comtronics (J. McMahon, S.D.N.Y. 1984-87); a libel case Fleischer v. Fantagraphics (J. Broderick, S.D.N.Y. 1984-86);
and an insurance coverage-attorney fee matter Yonkers Board of
Education v. CNA & Continental Casualty Co. (C.J. Brieant,
S.D.N.Y. 1987). Most recent Special Master assignments ave
included an international antitrust case (J. Rachey, D.D.C.
1986-1988; Hunt-short sale silver class action cases

"and panelist or. Piob. .\s and Techniques m Civ: lico cases at
the Federal Judicial Center s woiitshop for Judges of the Second
and Tnird Circuits - Saratoga Springs, New York
He nas also
didressed the Ninth Circuit Judges Workshop in January, 1987,
on Summary Judgment, Expert Testimony and Complex Litigation,
and the Federal Judicial Center seiminars for U S Magistrates
en Discovery Trends & Abuses' - June, July * Auqust, 1989.
From November 1978 to February 1982, Mr Schreiber was
President and Chief Executive Officer of a unit of the
Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York wnich provided
centralized legal, risk management and insurance services for
the Federation's hospitals, homes for the aged, and health,
education and community service agencies.
From 1955 to 1971 Mr. Schreiber was associated with
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company as trial counsel in the
federal and state courts in New York City
He was Resident
Counsel of their Brooklyn legal office from 1966-1971.
In the Fall, 1979, Mr. Schreiber served as the Hearing
Officer for the New York State Energy Master Planning and
Long-Range Electrical & Gas Planning.
An adjunct professor at Fordham Law School from 1972 1987, Mr. Schreiber conducted spring seminars on products
liability, occupational disease and liability insurance
litigation and trial advocacy,
Mr. Schreiber has been a participant in numerous
special project committees for the American Bar Association and
the Second Circuit, including service as the Reporter for the
ASA Advocacy Task Force, which led to the formation of the
National Institute for Trial Advocacy (1970-1971),
From 1973 to the present Mr. Schreiber has been the
planning and program chairman of the ALW-.BA Continuing
Professional Education national courses of study on federal
evidence, civil practice and litigation in federal and state
courts and has been a frequent lecturer at professional
programs and workshops on fedetal civil procedure, trial
evidence, product liability, occupational disease and liability
insurance, Mr. Schreiber has edited and co-edited more than 40
workk m these areas,
Additional and mote detailed publications, bar
association activities, and CLE program^ include:
1.
During his services as Special Master in the
Agent Orange litigation, a number of Mr, Schreiber's written
reports and recommendations, approved by the Court were
officially published in: 96 F.R.D. 578; 532; 582-587; 587-593,
97 F.R.D. 424-427; 427-439, 98 F.R.D. 522-539; 539-548;
558-56G, and 99 F.R.D. 338-339; 645-650

2
.j6;_iq75

Pr(^_e^^._onal_Actj.vit les
ABA Judicial Administration Division, Member.
1967-1975, Asst Secretary 1972-1975

;-)6?~i973

Committee on Trial Practice and technique
for the Second Circuit, Member 1967-1973.
Secretary l9t>7-i97u

1930 1982

Member, Comm;rrees on Healtn Care and Civil
Practice ard Procedure of the ABA Antitrust
Section

1970-1978

Joint InterprofcGSion-ii Committee of Doctors
and Lawyers of the First Department, New
York. Member 1970-1978, Chairman 1975-1978

1964-1971

Member, A.A,A. National Panel of Arbitration

1965 to
present

Association of the Bar of the City of New
York
Chairman, Medicine and Law Committee,
1965-1969
Chairman. Special Committee on Human
Experimentation, 1968-1970
Member, Federal Courts Committee, 1976-1979
Member, Committees on Products Liability
(1979-1986), science and Law (1985 - 1987)

1973-1977

planning staff, United States Magistrates'
Seminar Programs at the Federal Judicial
Center

1980-

Co-Chairperson. Legal Aid Society's Continuing
Education Seminars on Complex civil Litigation

1980-1982

Co-Chairman, New York State Bar Assn's.
Multi-Site Seminar on New York and Federal Rules
of Evidence and State Class Actions

1985-1987

Chairperson, Federal Asbestos Leqislation
Committee of the A B A Section of Tort & Insurance
Practice
Member, N,Y.State Bar - Association of the Bar of
the City of New York - Joint Task fcorce on
Liability Insurance Coverage

3. Cp n 11 n: i i :i^ Leg a I Educational Pi oqraav
I960 to
sieseiit

Developed and participated in tne noiiowxng
education workshops and proqramb *mder tne
sponsorship of various organizations including
the Practising Law Institute and the American Law
Institute-American 9ar Association Committee on
Continuing Professional Education *
Trial Evidence
Courtroom Techniques

Federal Civil Practlre and Litigation
Federal Criminal Practice and Procedure
Commercial and Corporate Litigation Problems
Class Actions under New Federal Rule 23
Products Liability
Medical and Professional Malpractice
Liability Insurance Litigation
Liability, Damages, and Medicine in Tort Cases
Current Problems in Federal Civil Practice
Practice under the N P W Fedeial R U I P S of Evidence
Civil Practice b Litigation in the Federal Courts
Hospital Liability
Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation
Medical Products Liability and Preventive Law
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
Employment Discrimination and Civil Rights
Actions in Federal Courts
4.

Publications

Developed and edited or co-edited the following works;
Civil Practice ft Litigation in the Federal Courts,
AH/AHA Continuing Legal Education course study
materials (4th EdL • 3 vol., 2700 pp., August 1936).
employment Discrimination and Civil Rights Actions in
Federal Courts (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials (3d.
Ed. June 1987; approx, 635 pp.)
Recent Developments in Section 198? Civil Rights
Litigation, PLI Handbook (1984, 655 pp.)
Trial Evidence & Techniques in Federal & State Courts
- A Clinical study of Recent Developments, ALI-ABA,
CLE Course Study Materials (revised for each of 30
programs, latest ed. October 1987, 660 pp.)

Suppl - , *27

l

) . HLi-hon

«. ur-v.

,

Liability Insurance Disputes, I960, 8()0 pp., PLI text
Products Liability • Law. Practue. Science (co-edited
with Paul Rheingold), 1^67, 120C pp., PLI text
Trial Evidence, 1967, 160 pp, (2d rev.ed,,ed-, 1969),
PLI text
Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 1905, 660 pp., PLI
text
Medico-Legal Aspects of Bank Injury Cases, 1962f 710
pp., PLI text
Commercial and Corporate Litigation, 1968, 285 pp.,
PLI Handbook
New Federal Class Act inn Rule, 196S, 150 pp., PLI
Handbook
Federal Criminal Practice and Procedure, 1968, 200
pp., PLI Handbook
Auto Insurance Problems, 1968, 4co pp., PLI Handbook
Professional Malpractice, 1967, 3 vols., 500 pp.r PLI
Handbook
Liability In Personal Injury Cases, 1966, 620 pp., PLI
Handbook
Effective Personal Injury Practice, 1968, 640 pp., PLI
Handbook
Personal Injury Medicine, 1965, 800 pp., PLI Handbook
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"Trial Evidence ar.d Techniques in Federal and State
Courts: A Clinical Srudy of Recent Developments"
(previously entitled. "Practice under the New Federal
Rules o£ Evidence")
April, 1973
March, 1974
December, 19 74
February, 197=
March, 1975
May, 197 5
June, 1975
October, 1975
November, 19 75
December, 19 7 5
March, 1976
June, 1976
October, 1976
March, 1978
June, 1978
October, 1978
February 2, 1979
June, 1979
September, 1979
February, 1980
November, 1980
September
1981
February, 1982
September
1982
January, 1983
September, 1983
December, 1983
August, 1984
February, 1985
August. 1985
February, 1986
May. 1986
July, 1986
November. 1986
February, 1987
July, 1987
October, 1987
January, 1988
December, 1988
February, 1989

San Francisco
Los Angeles
New York City
Coronado, California
Wichita, Kansas
Columbia, South Carolina
Norman, Oklahoma
Washington, D. C.
Austin, Texas
St. Thomas, Virgin Islands
Albuquerque, New Mexico
Miami
Seattle
Atlanta
Villanova, Pennsylvania
St, Thomas, Virgin Islands
Los Angeles
Madison, Wisconsin
Charleston, South Carolina
Seattle
St. Thomas, Virgin Islands
New York City
San Francisco
Charleston, South Carolina
Los Angeles
San Antonio, Texas
Arlington, Virginia
Detroit
Scottsdaie, Arizona
San Francisco
Hawaii
San Juan, Puerto Rico
San Francisco
Dallas
San Diego
SantA Fe
Charleston, S.C
Orlando, FL
New Orleans, LA
Scottsdaie, Arizona
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•j.i Fractice and Litigat '. <JC.m
November, 1979
June. 1980
January, 1981
April, 1981
November, 1981
January, 1982
June, 1982
March, 1983
March, 1984
April, 1984
November, 1984
August, 1981;
December, 1985
February, 1986
May. 1986
July, 1986
November, 19 86
February, 1987
July, 1987
October, 1987
January, 1988
July 11-13, 1988
Dec. 2-3, 1988
Feb. 2-3, 1989

3)

Federal and State Courts'

San Juan, Puerto Rico
Villanova, Pennsylvania
New York City
Houston
San Juan, Puerto Rico
San Diego
New York City
New Orlear.9
Coronado, California
Charleston, South Carolina
Washington, D. C.
San Francisco

west Palm Beach
Hawaii
San Juan, Puerto Rico
San Francisco
Dallas
San Diego
San Francisco
Charleston, S.C.
Orlando, FL
Snowmass, Colorado
New Orleans

Scottsdale, AZ

Employment Discrimination S Civil Rights Actions in
Federal Courts
April, 1986

December, 1986
July, 1987
August, 1988
July, 1989

Boston
Los Angeles
New York
San Francisco
Malibu, CA
April

4)

"Medical Products Liability and Preventive Law,
6 7, 1984, Philadelphia

5)

"Class and Derivative Actions and Other Multiparty Complex
Litigation Practical Problems and New Approaches, October
26-28, 1978, Washington, D.C.

6)

Toxic Torts, Products Liability, Compensatory and Punitive
Damages, rnsurance Coverage Disputes, Legal Malpractice,
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings and Civil Litigation
(July 14-16, 1988 - Snowmass, Colorado)

7)

Self-Insurance Developments - Recent Legal, Regulatory and
Commercial Trends Involving Foreign Domestic Captives,
Risk Retention, Coverage - Reinsurance and Insolvency
Disputes (Bermuda, March 9-11, 1989)

8)

United States/Canadian Business Litigation Issues: A
Comparative Study (Co-Sponsored by The Canadian 3ar and
The American Law Institute (Toronto, November 16-17, 1989)
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New York and Now Ot le^ns (September October, 1984) Recent
Developments in Section 19H3 Crnl Rights Litigation

2)

New York, Chicago and 1^5 Angeles (Match, April, Kay,
1985) Comprenensive Crime Control Act ot 1984

3)

Mew York, San Francisco (March, April 1966)
- Current Insurance issues
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GORDON v. HUNT
Class Action - Short
Sales - Silver Cases
Settling Master

12/88 -

80 Civ. 5678 (S.D.N.Y.)
J. Lasker

MEYER V. MACMILLAN
Class Action Employment Discrimination

3/85 -

78 Civ. 2133 (S.D.N.Y.)
J. Lasker

9/84

73 Civ. 5434 (S.D.N.Y.)
J.Gagiiardi

4/82 - 1/84

MDL 381 (E.D.N.Y.)
J. Piatt
J.Weinstein

MELANI v. BOARD OF
EDUCATION
Class Action
Employment Discrimination
AGENT ORANGE
Mass Tort Class Action
Special Master
ST. CHARLES V. EAGLE
COMTRONICS
Contract Suit
Special Master
BROOKLYN IMMIGRATION
DETENTION CENTER
Pro-Bono Monitor
Constitutional Rights
YONKERS BD. OF ED.
V CNA
Counsel Fee
Special Master
SOCIETE LIZ v.
CHARLES OF RITZ
International Antitrust
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FLEISCHER v.
FANTAGRAPHICS
Libel Case
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11/84 - 3/87 83 Civ, 7126 (S.D.N.Y.)
J.MacMahon

3/82 - 5/84

79 Civ. 0795 (E.D.N.Y.)
J.Nickerson

1/87 - 1/88

85 Civ. 8859 (S.D.N.Y.)
C.J. Brieant

12/86 - 5/88 85 Civ. 1129 (D. D . C )
J. Richey

6/84 - 1/86

80 Civ. 5678 (S.D.N.Y.)
J. Bcoderick

APPENDIX "B"
PROFFER
(THOMAS T. ANDERSON)

PROFFER:
Comes now counsel for depositors and submits the following as a proffer of
proof.

If Mr. Thomas T. Anderson were called as a witness for the petitioners, he

would testify as follows:
1.

That the attached is his Curriculum Vitae and that it is true and

2.

That he has represented many plaintiffs and has secured may verdicts

correct.

and settlements in excess of $1,000,000, and is familiar with the factors that are used
to determine a reasonable fee in contingent fee cases.
3.

Based on the hypothetical question asked, it is his opinion that a

reasonable fee would be $11 million or 25% of $44 million. At the outside 25% of $29
million would be $7.25 million and that would be reasonable if there is to be an
additional recovery of fees from other sources or other defendants.
4.

In his opinion, $5.8 million or 20% of $29 million is inadequate, but from

the standpoint of everyone but the lawyers could not be considered unreasonable.
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THOMAS T. ANDERSON
Curriculum Vitae
1.

Member, The Inner Circle of Advocates, 1985-present,
Limited to top 100 personal injury* attorneys in the
United States.
Member, International Academy of Trial Lawyers, 1989present.
Selected by "Town & Country Magazine," June 1985, as 1
of 84 Best General Trial Lawyers in America.

4.

Selected in the 1989 edition of "The Best Lawyers in
America" the best personal injury attorney in Riverside
County, California* This conclusion based upon a survey
of lawyers who were asked to select the best lawyers in
their county.

5.

President, California Trial Lawyers Association,
1970-1971.

6.

Judicial Council, State of California, 1978 and 1979.

7.

Vice President, California Trial Lawyers Association,
1966-1969.

8.

Member, Board of Governors, Association of Trial Lawyers
of America, 1971-1977.

9.

Executive Committee, Association of Trial Lawyers of
America, 1973-1976.

10.

Co-author, Association of Trial Lawyers of America Basic
Advocacy Manual, 1968.

11.

Member, Board of Governors, California Trial Lawyers
Association, 1968-1977„

12.

President, Desert Bar Association, 1963-64 and 1964-65.

13.

Member, Board of Trustees, Desert Bar Association,
1957-1968

Member, Board of Governors, Western Trial Lawyers
Association, 1964-1970.
Trustee, Attorneys Congressional Campaign Trust, 19751978.
Member of California Bar Association, Association of
Trial Lawyers of America, California Trial Lawyers
Association, Western Trial Lawyers Association, Desert
Bar Association, and International Society of
Barristers, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice (TLPJ),
National Board of Trial Advocacy.
Public office, Board of Trustees, Palm Springs BOYS 1
Club, 1973-1978, and Board of Trustees, Palm Valley
School, 1962-1977.
Accepted Jesus Christ as personal saviour on September
5, 1976. Since that date has been a member of the Board
of Trustees, Youth for Christ; Board of Governors,
Institute for Creation Research; Board of Trustees,
Ariel Ministries; Board of Directors, Julian Center; cocounsel and Assistant Attorney General for the State of
Louisiana in Keith v. Board of Educationf wherein
declaration is being sought for the constitutionality
and enforcement of a statute requiring teaching of
Creation Science if Evolution Science is taught in the
public schools of Louisiana; lectured to various groups,
including attorneys, on the subject matter of the
evidence supporting the deity of Christ.
Education: B.B.A. degree, University of Oregon, 1949;
B#S. degree, Willamette University, Salem, Oregon;
two years of Law School at Willamette University; and
received L.L.B. degree from University of San Francisco,
1955.
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HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION
Mr. Anderson:
I intend to ask your opinion as to what would be a fair fee for plaintiff's
counsel in this pending case. As a basis for your opinion, I want you to assume the
following facts to be true.
1.

For many years prior to July of 1986, the State of Utah had a privately

insured thrift & loan industry.

The industry consisted of depository institutions

chartered as industrial loan corporations, commonly known as thrift & loan companies
or "thrifts."

Deposits in the thrift & loan companies were to be guaranteed to a

statutory limit of 515,000.00 per account by a legislatively created private guarantee
corporation. The guarantee corporation, however, was grossly undercapitalized from its
inception.

Healthy thrifts fled to the safety of FDIC or FSLIC coverage.

Five less

healthy thrifts could not qualify for federal deposit insurance and remained with the
guarantee corporation which I will designate by its acronym ILGC.
2.

I want you to assume that in 1985 and 1986, these five thrift institu-

tions were in grave financial difficulty and their impaired condition was known to state
officials and to the state commissioner of financial institutions. The state was working
toward finding a solution for the problems. During that time that the State of Utah
knew that the ILGC (Industrial Loan Guarantee Corporation) was insolvent and unable
to guarantee the deposits, but nevertheless, failed to tell the depositors of that
circumstance on the theory that it could find an equitable solution that would be more
advantageous to the depositors than allowing the ILGC and the thrift institutions
themselves to fail
3.

Not finding a satisfactory solution such as a take-over or buy-out, the

State of Utah, on July 31, 1986, closed said thrift institutions and put ILGC into
receivership at which time the losses to the depositors were estimated to be in the
neighborhood of 5106,000,000 principal.

Of the 5106,000,000, at that time it was

estimated that 531,000,000 could be recovered by fast liquidation, that 541,000,000 was
liquid, and that there would be about a 544,000,000 shortfall.
4.

The 5106,000,000 in lost deposits represented «KHw~*^ately

17,000

accounts held by approximately 9,000 depositors. Certain depositors formed a committee to act on behalf of all depositors to seek redress from the State of Utah and its
Department of Financial Institutions.

When those efforts failed, the committee chose

to seek redress in a court of law on behalf of the depositor class.

(

The depositor

committee conducted nationwide interviews to find counsel to represent the class. The
committee finally chose class counsel from over 50 firms.

The firms selected were

Misuraca, Beyers, Costin, Case & Provencher and Haley & Stolebarger.

The principal

lawyers involved were Malcolm Misuraca and Doug Provencher of Misuraca, Beyers,
Costin, Case & Provencher and George Haley of Haley & Stolebarger.
^ m | 0 The depositor committee, as representative of the class, and class
counsel signed a written contingent fee agreement prior to commencement of the
action. The contingent fee agreement provided that class counsel should be awarded a
fee of between 20 and 40 percent of amounts recovered.

The depositor committees

insisted the case be taken on a contingent fee basis or not at all.
6.

In response to an invitation from the committee, approximately 80% of

the class members (100% of the class members responding) expressly authorized class
counsel to present claims on their behalf and ratified the engagement of class counsel
on a contingent fee basis.
7.

To bring the case class counsel was first required to successfully achieve

a declaratory judgment on the following issues:
a.

Whether notices of claims under the Utah Governmental Immunity

Act could be filed on behalf of a class of persons rather than individually. This was

2

an issue of first impression in the State of Utah with a split of authority in surrounding states.
b.

Whether the limitations date barring claims under the Utah

Governmental Act could be extended on equitable grounds.* The grounds were the State
of Utah's misleading assurances that the State would satisfy the claims in spite of the
claimant's non-compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act.

In fact, the State's

true intentions came to light the time in which to bring the claims had run.
8.

After successfully litigation those procedural hurdles, class counsel filed

a comprehensive complaint for damages and other relief.

The complaint named 60

defendants and 300 Doe defendants specified in the complaint by category.

Included

among the named defendants were the State of Utah, the Department of Financial
Institutions and its past and present officers, a prestigious Salt Lake City law firm,
other thrift & loan institutions, and representatives of thrift & loan institutions who
had served as trustees of the failed guarantee company which was to have guaranteed
thrift deposits.

The thrift & loan institutions and their representatives named as

defendants consisted of a significant portion of power and wealth in the State of Utah.
The complaint included the following claims:
a.

Common law deceit or fraud;

b.

Other species of fraud;

c.

Statutory fraud such as fraudulent conveyances;

d.

Per se liability for the breach of criminal statutes including the

felony of receiving deposits into an insolvent financial institution;
e.

Breach of duty;

f.

Violations of securities laws;

g.

Constitutional violations;

h.

Breach of express, implied and constructive contracts;
3

i.

Negligence;

j.

Other torts;

k.

Civil conspiracy;

1.

Violations of the federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act; and
m.

Violations of the Utah Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt

Enterprise Act and its successor the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act.
9.

The named defendants hired the prestigious big name counsel in Utah to

defend them.

They responded with a barrage of motions to dismiss, motions for a

more definite statement and motions to strike.

Class counsel performed extensive

discovery, formal and otherwise, and extensive research to establish the liability of the
State and the other defendants.

Oral argument on the motions lasted an entire day.

The court took the motions under advisement and the motions were still pending when
settlement was later reached.
10.

Class counsel also sought a legislative solution at the same time they

were prosecuting the civil action.

Class counsel attempted to recover the depositors'

lost saving through means of legislation before the Utah Legislature which would have
created a new bank with State backing comprised of the remaining assets of the failed
thrifts.

The legislative measure required extensive research and negotiation.

The

measure failed to pass in the general session, but that effort led to the enactment of
legislation creating a task force to examine the failed thrift crisis and to evaluate
whether or not the State of Utah was liable to the depositors.
11.

Class counsel appeared before the task force and revealed for the first

time damaging evidence against the State of Utah. At the request of the task force's
counsel, class counsel briefed a number of issues including:
a*

the State's liability to the depositors;
4

b.

the State's insurance coverage for its liability to the depositors;

c.

the inapplicability of a 515,000 per account statutory limitation

on deposit guarantees claimed as a defense by the State, and
d.
12.

claims against defendants other than the State of Utah.

Class counsel then negotiated over a period of several months a

settlement with the Governor of the State of Utah and the State's insurer which
provided a recovery to the class of approximately S44 million. Once approved by the
Governor the settlement had to be enacted by enabling legislation in special session by
the Utah Legislature which had already refused to provide relief to the thrift depositors in the general session.

The Legislature finally passed the settlement bill after a

month of negotiation with class counsel and four meetings of the special session. Once
approved by the Utah legislature the settlement had to be approved by the class action
court in which the class action was pending.

Once approved by the court the settle-

ment had to be approved by a majority of the class on individual notice to each class
member.
13.

Of the settlement funds, $15 million of the $44 million settlement is a

nonrecourse, interest free advance from the State of Utah to the depositors on the
proceeds of future liquidation of the thrift assets. The proceeds of future liquidation,
if any, will be divided between the depositors and the State until the advance is
repaid.

Although class counsels' contingent fee contract allowed for a fee on the

entire $44 million recovery, class counsel sought no fee with respect to the $15 million
advance from the State.

Class counsel claimed a fee only with respect to the $29

million portion.
14.

Of the $29 million, the State contributed $10 million and the State's

insurers contributed $19 million. The State's own counsel had advised the State it had
at most only $1 million in coverage. Class counsel was able to convince the State and
5

its insurers of the State's extensive risk in spite of its limited coverage, which
ultimately resulted in the State's insurers tendering S19 million toward settlement.
15.

The time spent by class counsel up to the time of the settlement, if

charged at their normal hourly rates, would yield a charge of approximately $1.8
million.

Class counsel have additionally spent thousands of hours implementing the

settlement.
16.

Class counsel is in the process of filing a new amended complaint

against remaining defendants including four Big Eight accounting firms, several smaller
accounting firms, officers and directors of the failed thrifts, and the law firm previously named as a defendant.

A new survey of the class revealed that 94.4% of the

class desires class counsel to proceed to prosecute the remaining claims.

The class

committee and representative plaintiffs recognize the importance of maintaining a
professional relationship with class counsel and the importance of preserving the
contractual rights and obligations under the contingency fee agreement to insure that
the case will continue against the remaining defendants on the agreed upon terms.
Accordingly, they have repeatedly stated orally and in writing that class counsel should
receive a reasonable fee from the settlement proceeds and that the contingent fee
agreement should be honored.
17.

Costs of approximately $1.0 million were incurred, approximately $800,000

of which was for expert fees.

A large portion of class counsel's out-of-pocket

expenses were paid as incurred by the class. A balance of approximately $650,000 of
the costs remains unpaid and for which class counsel is obligated.
18.

The class consists of approximately 9,000 persons, holding approximately

17,000 accounts in the failed thrifts.
19.

The court made a preliminary ruling that it would authorize a fee of

$5.8 million or 20% of the $29 million recovery. There appears to be no significant or
6

meaningful dissatisfaction by the depositors 'to that amount.

No one has raised a

protest or entered an objectionBased on the above facts which I have asked you to assume, do you have an
opinion regarding what would be a reasonable fee for counsel representing the
depositors?
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